University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2016

The Problem of Creative Collaboration
Anthony Casey
dangelolawlib+anthonycasey@gmail.com

Andres Sawicki
Andres.Sawicki@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony Casey & Andres Sawicki, "The Problem of Creative Collaboration," Coase-Sandor Working Paper
Series in Law and Economics, No. 761 (2016).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 761

THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki
THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
March 2016

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2772710

The Problem of Creative Collaboration
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki
In this Article, we explore a central problem facing
creative industries: how to organize collaborative creative
production? We identify informal rules as a significant and
pervasive—but nonetheless overlooked—tool for solving that
problem. While existing literature has focused on the role
that informal rules play in creating incentives for the
production of creative work, we demonstrate how such rules
can be even more influential in facilitating and organizing
collaboration in the creative space.
We also suggest that informal rules are often a better fit
for organization than formal law. Unique features of
creativity, especially high uncertainty and low verifiability,
create organizational challenges that formal law cannot
address, as demonstrated by recent high profile cases like
Garcia v. Google. But certain informal rules can meet these
challenges and facilitate organization where law fails to do
so. We explain how informal rules functioning through
mechanisms like reputation and trust can sustain an
organizational solution without a manager, a hierarchical
firm, or formal law allocating control rights. Finally, we
sketch out the dynamics in hybrid situations of creative
organization where informal rules function alongside formal
law.
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INTRODUCTION
A central problem that faces any creative team is how to
organize collaboration. Virtually all of creative production
involves the combination of multiple inputs. Some of those
inputs are major while others are minor. A film, for example,
will include writing, acting, set design, costume production,
editing, and the like. These creative inputs must be
organized; and part of that organization includes decisions
over who controls inputs and the final output.
The complicated nature of these questions has been
highlighted in recent high profile cases like Garcia v.
Google 1 and 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin. 2 Both cases grappled
with the question of how much control an input provider had
over the use of a specific input (and therefore also over the
end product which contained the input). The opinions in
these cases raised more questions than they answered about
what it means to be an author for purposes of copyright law,
what it means to control a creative work, and what even
qualifies as a creative work.
The hypothesis we explore in this article is that courts
struggle to decide these—and many other—disputes in
creative industries because the parties never intended for
formal law to resolve them. Instead, a complex set of
informal rules that only tangentially intersect with formal
law regulates the behavior of creative collaborators. Courts
are nonetheless confronted with these kinds of disputes (in
at least some instances, as in Garcia, this can happen when
one of the participants is not a member of the creative
community). When this happens, courts superimpose rigid
concepts from formal copyright law onto the flexible and
messy reality of creative collaboration. At best, those courts
create elaborate fictions to mimic informal norms; at worst,
they get things completely wrong, potentially undermining
the informal norms required for creative collaboration to
operate in the ordinary course.
While formal copyright law nominally applies to
determine who controls the output of creative work, creative
production poses organizational problems that formal
copyright law simply cannot solve. Instead, informal rules
operating through mechanisms like trust and reputation
1
2

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015).
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regulate collaboration throughout the creative industries.
The significant and pervasive role that informal rules play
in organizing creative collaboration means that copyright
theory must account for the dynamics of informal rules to
reach an accurate understanding of how to allocate control of
creative production. But it currently does not.
This suggests that informal rules play a more important
role than copyright theorists have recognized. Others have
suggested that informal rules create incentives for creative
production in “negative spaces”—such as cuisine, stand-up
comedy, and tattoos—where copyright protection is
unavailable. 3 But this views the influence of informal rules
on creativity too narrowly.
Informal rules in fact cover everything from how
producers and directors decide when a film is finished, to
how co-authors share ideas, to how musicians choose band
mates. In this way, informal rules regulate film, theater,
music, television, and publishing. These are not negative
spaces on copyright’s periphery. 4 These are industries at the
Copyright may be unavailable for various reasons. Legal doctrine may
limit its scope; litigation costs may make enforcement impractical; or
community preferences that operate outside of the conventional legal
system may dominate behavior. See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von
Hippel, Norm-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French
Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 191 (2008) (noting the absence of effective
copyright law in the relationships among haute cuisine chefs in France);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of
Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (exploring the lack
of a “cost-effective way [for comics to] protect[] the essence of their
creativity”); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of
Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1130-40 (2007) (challenging existing
explanations, based on doctrinal limitations, for the lack of protection for
novel cuisine); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 511 (2013) (setting out the challenges to legal protection for
tattoos). The new consensus is that in these marginal “negative spaces”
of intellectual property, informal rules operate in place of formal law to
prevent freeriding and to encourage creative production. See Elizabeth L.
Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317
(2011); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV.
1687, 1769-75 (2006) (cataloging potential negative spaces).
4 See Rosenblatt, supra note 3 (defining the idea of negative spaces); see
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3, at 199 (arguing that norm-based
IP systems arise where formal law is “inadequate or unsatisfactory”);
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1789-90 (arguing that copyright law
is inadequate to protect the work of stand-up comics); Perzanowski,
3
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core of copyright’s domain. Informal rules are essential to
creative production—including activity at the very center of
the copyright industries—because they are the key
mechanism shaping the organization of collaborative work.
The centrality of informal rules for all kinds of
collaborative creative production makes urgent the need to
understand how they interact, and potentially conflict, with
formal law. Otherwise, statutory grants of ownership or
judicial interpretations of formal copyright law can interfere
with long established norms of creative collaboration in
complex and unforeseen ways. In the best case, norms and
informal rules will evolve to work around this interference.
In the worst case, the formal law will hinder norms of
creative collaboration. Understanding how this interaction
plays out is therefore crucial to a coherent theory of
copyright law. And cases like Garcia and Merkin will only
make sense once that understanding is in hand.
Our analysis connects an extensive academic literature
on organizational theories—with a focus on theories of firms
and teams—to an emerging literature on informal rules in
intellectual property. 5 By linking these two literatures, we
supra note 3, at 567 (describing cultural aversion in tattoo to formal law
that renders reliance on copyright law unacceptable).
5 We forge new ground in revealing the importance of informal rules for
organizing collaborative creation in the copyright space. For work
exploring adjacent areas involving informal rules and private ordering in
the use and production of information, see BRETT M. FRISCHMANN,
MICHAEL J. MADISON, & KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG, GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (2015) (exploring the governance of knowledge
commons); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, & Katherine J.
Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010) (same); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS (2006) (exploring organization of modular inputs in
creativity); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161
(2000) (applying transaction cost theories to explain how formal law
affects private ordering solutions to problems facing creative
collaborations); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms
of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (exploring
the interaction between the formal law of patents and scientific sharing
norms); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661543
(2004) (describing non-state institutional solutions to appropriability
problems in the production of technical information); Arti Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) (studying the influence of
informal rules on inter-team collaboration in the production of science).

5

develop the novel hypothesis that informal rules are the
primary driver behind the organization of collaborative
creative production. The IP-and-organizational-theory
literature has focused primarily on the influence of formal
law rather than informal rules on the organization of
creative production. The IP-norms literature has focused on
the influence of informal rules on individual incentives
rather than organization. To bridge this divide, we explain
how informal rules enforced through mechanisms like
reputation and trust directly affect how creators organize
their collaborative activity.
The result is a form of network or community governance
and control that suggests that copyright law’s obsessive
attempts at tying together authorship, ownership, and
control are futile. For whatever the law will tell us about
who owns a copyrighted product, the facts on the ground will
tell us something quite different about who controls and
creates it. Formal rules might be designed to cleanly allocate
ownership on the assumption that control travels with
ownership; but informal rules may adapt to frustrate those
designs and allocate control wherever the creative
community sees fit. And formal law that overrides those
norms and forcibly consolidates control (if that is even
possible) will have dramatic and unforeseen effects on the
network of creative production.
In developing this theory, we also explore the potential
downsides to informal rules. For example, informal rules can
introduce bias into decisions where formal law might be
more even handed. Reputation (intentionally or not)
transfers and perpetuates the bias of those who pass that
reputation on. More subtly, informal rules and norms can be
manipulated to favor certain groups or certain traits over
others. And they are amorphous enough to be invoked
inconsistently to serve agendas that are less than
transparent. These concerns are particularly relevant in
light of the recent and well-publicized gender and racial
disparities in opportunities and pay in the film, television,
and other creative industries.
Finally, we sketch out the landscape of potential
interactions among formal law, informal rules, and the
organization of creative collaborative production. In some
instances, informal rules might substitute for formal law; if
copyright law leaves an area largely unregulated (as is the
case for improvisational comedy), informal rules may act
6

alone to support creative collaboration. In other instances,
formal law and informal rules may be complements; in
television, for example, formal copyright law’s derivative
work right may grant power to managers sufficient to enable
the manager to organize the team, but informal rules
governing credit for work may further support these
hierarchical collaborations. In still other instances, formal
law may crowd out informal rules (and vice versa); nonWestern cultural models that import Western copyright law
may undermine existing informal rules that are necessary to
support particular forms of creative collaboration. 6
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the
literatures on creative organizations and on norms and
customs. We show how these areas of study intersect in
creative collaboration to raise important new questions. Part
II describes the challenges of creative collaboration and
demonstrates that formal law is insufficient to address those
challenges. Part III first explores how informal rules
enforced through mechanisms like trust and reputation can
be the central organizational rules for creative collaboration;
it then demonstrates how creative collaboration may be
governed by informal rules that exist entirely outside of a
firm or management hierarchy. Part IV provides examples of
these mechanisms at work and identifies important
implications of this analysis, showing how it can be applied
to understand challenging questions like those presented in
Garcia and Merkin.
I.

CONNECTING THEORIES OF INFORMAL RULES TO
THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION

Classic intellectual property incentives theory holds that
creative works are public goods, so only formal rights to
exclude others will provide creators sufficient incentives to
produce them. 7 Two separate strands of scholarship have
undermined this theory. The first analyzes informal rules 8
For example, when the law fails to define authorship in peculiar cases,
there is no back up norm to provide any guidance to the parties. See
Casey & Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1713
(2013) (discussing difficult authorship cases where neither law nor
custom could cleanly identify the “author”).
7 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 281, 293-94 (1970).
8 Terms like “custom,” “norm,” and “informal rule” are used to mean
many things. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom
6
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that guide the creation of intellectual property. Building on
customs-and-norms work in other fields, 9 scholars in this
tradition have shown that informal rules can also provide
the incentives traditionally provided by intellectual property
law. 10
The second strand approaches intellectual property
problems from the perspective of the theory of the firm, an
economic literature devoted to understanding how and why
production is organized in a firm rather than a market. 11
This work has shown that intellectual property law
influences not only creators’ motivation to produce, but also
the organizational structures in which creators produce.
Both strands of literature address intellectual property
generally. For the purposes of this article, we focus more
narrowly on copyright. We do so because creative work in
the artistic and expressive fields regulated by copyright law

in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1900-01 n. 1 (2007)
(collecting sources demonstrating the various uses of these terms). And
very fine lines can be drawn for any definition. See Robert Ellickson, A
Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987) (identifying five types of rules—personal ethics,
norms, contract, organizational, and governmental—and five types of
sanction—self-sanction,
personal
self-help,
vicarious
self-help,
organizational, and state). To illustrate our point simply, we will
generally divide our analysis into two categories: 1) informal rules—
rules enforced through non-state sanction; and 2) formal law—rules
enforced by state sanction.
9 See, for example, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984);
Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System, Extralegal Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); STEWART MACAULEY, NONCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS IN BUSINESS: A PRELIMINARY STUDY (1963).
10 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3; Fauchart & von Hippel, note 3.
11 See generally, R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
389 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113–14 (1971);
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 785–95 (1972);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,
98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1125–49 (1990); Benjamin Klein, Robert G.
Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978);
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 691 (1986); Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete
Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the
Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 183 (2011).
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may differ from creative work in the technical and scientific
fields regulated by patent law. 12
In this Part, we review the implications of these
literatures for copyright law and identify important
questions revealed by their nexus.
A. Encouraging Creative Production
The literature on informal rules and creativity has
focused either on identifying norms that fill gaps where
formal intellectual property law is weak (e.g., the fashion,
food, or stand-up comedy industries), or on identifying how
the legal system should (or should not) use norms and
customs to guide the design of intellectual property law. A
particular (though not exclusive) focus of this literature has
been on industries (plausibly or not quite) covered by
copyright. 13
These questions have generally been approached with
the classic intellectual property story in mind. According to
that story, producers have insufficient incentives to produce
creative goods unless there are barriers to copying. 14 The
traditional policy response to this problem is to create
intellectual property laws that impose legal penalties on
those who copy creative goods without permission. 15
While this story accurately describes a wide range of
creative activity, IP scholars have explored several ways in
which it is incomplete. The IP-and-norms literature
emphasizes that formal law is not the only mechanism that
can prevent copying. Instead, social norms can plausibly do

Research in the interdisciplinary field of creativity studies has
suggested that this is the case. See John Baer, The Case for the Domain
Specificity of Creativity, 2 CREATIVITY RES. J. 173 (1998). For example,
perhaps participants in technical or scientific fields can generate
predictable and objective criteria to measure whether an input has
successfully contributed to the creative process; this would enable a
different set of solutions to creative collaborations in those fields than is
possible in the artistic and expressive fields regulated by copyright law.
We do not here express a view on the particular characteristics that
might distinguish the technical and scientific fields; we only note that it
is possible that they differ from those in the artistic and expressive
fields, and that a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of the
present Article.
13 See supra note 3.
14 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1790.
15 Id.
12
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a lot of the same work. 16 Social norms that punish
unauthorized imitation might substitute for formal legal
barriers to copying, and thereby preserve incentives to
produce creative goods. 17
These norms, we are told, spring up in the “negative
spaces” where formal protection is weak. They provide a
substitute for the incentive-generating force of formal law.
Thus, whether legal protection is merely unavailable under
prevailing doctrine, 18 impractical or impossible because of
specific industry characteristics, 19 or supplanted by other
community preferences, 20 its weakness creates a vacuum for
informal law to fill.
For example, in the world of stand-up comics, formal law
does very little to protect jokes. 21 A stand-up comic who
creates a new joke cannot (for doctrinal and social reasons)
turn to formal law to prevent another comic from telling the
same joke. But that negative space is filled by an informal
Foundational work on social norms can be found in both property
literature and contract literature. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW (1991) (describing private ordering among ranchers in Shasta
County, California that rendered government-provided rules irrelevant);
Stewart Macauley, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AMER. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (exploring the informal rules
governing business relations in manufacturing); Lisa Bernstein, Opting
out of the Legal System, Extralegal Relations in the Diamond Industry,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law
in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). More recently, others have
examined how social norms might affect the structuring of transactions
so as to prevent disputes from arising, rather than resolving them after
they occur. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J.
281 (2013) (describing cooperative norms in Silicon Valley that drive
large technology firms to avoid poaching teams of engineers from startups and instead to pursue acqui-hires, in which venture capitalists and
early investors receive payments when the large firm absorbs all of the
start-up’s engineering talent).
17 See generally Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3 (describing anti-copying
norms in stand-up comedy); Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3
(describing anti-copying norms in French cuisine). It is also possible that
industry norms complement or subvert legal rules regarding copying.
See, e.g., Lior Strahelivitz, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (exploring the
emergence of social norms of copying in the file sharing space); Oliar &
Sprigman, supra note 3; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3.
18 Compare Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3 at 191, and Buccafusco,
supra note 3, at 1130-40.
19 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1790; Perzanowski, supra note
3.
20 See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 3.
21 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1817-18.
16
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rule: comics should not tell jokes previously told by other
comics. Those who have been credibly accused of violating
this norm incur penalties from the community of stand-up
comics. 22 These penalties are both non-economic penalties
(in the form of reduced social status) and economic penalties
(lost bookings). 23
Similarly, French chefs exist in a world of weak formal
law. Copyright law does not provide meaningful protection
for novel recipes developed by those chefs. 24 But the
community regulates (mis)appropriation: the chefs
understand that members of their community will refuse to
engage in mutually beneficial information exchange with
chefs who have been credibly accused of copying recipes from
other chefs. 25
The IP and norms literature both confirms and
contradicts the classical theory. On the one hand, it confirms
the incentive story that tells us creators need protection
from free-riding by rivals to draw them into creative
production. 26 On the other hand, the literature rejects the
suggestions of some classical theories that formal law is the
necessary and exclusive means of protection for these
industries.
B. Organizing Creative Production
The classic theory of copyright law has another unrelated
shortcoming: it generally assumes that a sole creator acts
alone to produce creative work. 27 This assumption is
Id.
Id. Similar dynamics—though complicated in part by the role of
trademark law—may also be at play in the fashion industry. See
Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006); Raustiala &
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009);
Hemphill and Suk, Reply Remix and Cultural Production, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1227 (2009).
24 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3.
25 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3. Other areas of creative
production may also have similar norms. See, e.g., Perzanowski supra
note 3.
26 See Breyer, supra note 7 at 293-94. That story of the need for
incentives (formal or informal) is not without its critics. See id. at 294323 (challenging the empirical underpinnings for the standard
justification of copyright law).
27 See BENKLER, supra note 5, at 42 (describing the “ideal-type strategy
that underlies patents and copyrights” as resting on a conception “of the
information producer as a single author or inventor laboring creatively”).
22
23
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consistent with popular western conceptions of creative
production. 28 But it is inconsistent with how creativity
actually occurs. Virtually all creative work is collaborative or
cumulative. 29 The collaborative nature of most creative work
means that there are crucial organizational issues facing
creators that classic theory simply does not address.
This is where the scholarship on the organization of
intellectual production comes in. Consider the possibility
that two creative inputs must be combined to produce a
finished product. 30 Formal intellectual property law does not
protect creative inputs from appropriation, at least not
during the course of much of the production process. 31 Still,
creative goods are commonly produced by a team of people,
each of whom provides creative inputs to the joint project.
Such a team faces the risk of shirking by teammates because
it will often be hard to observe or verify whether each team
member is carrying her weight, and because the team
members’ efforts produce a single inseparable good. 32
See supra note 5.
Rebecca Tushnet notes “The concept of Romantic authorship has come
under sustained analytic assault, as scholars have demonstrated that all
works derive from other works.” Rebecca Tushnet, The Romantic Author
and the Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered Concepts of Creativity,
(forthcoming); see also sources cited supra note 3; Casey & Sawicki,
supra note 6; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust,
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming).
30 In the non-creative context, where inputs are tangible assets managed
by different people who cannot write perfectly complete contracts, the
standard property-rights solution to this sort of problem is integration.
Hart & Moore, supra note 11, at 1125–49; see also Philippe Aghion &
Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What
Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 183
(2011).
31 Copyright protection begins only upon fixation. See generally Casey &
Sawicki, supra note 6.
32 Additional organizational theories tell us how intellectual property
law can affect production that combines creative and non-creative goods.
Pioneering research by Robert Merges & Ashish Arora and Dan Burk &
Brett McDonnell explores this question. They used the theory of the firm
lens to understand formal intellectual property law and provide insights
into its influence on market transactions and integration trends in tech
industries. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input
Markets, and the Value of Intangible Assets *5 (unpublished draft, Feb 9,
1999), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/iprights.pdf (visited June 5,
2013); Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms,
Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451
(2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 575; Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71
28
29
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In many production functions outside the context of
creative collaborations, the costs of shirking can be reduced
by contract or—where contracts are incomplete—through
the imposition of the hierarchical management structure of
a firm. 33 These mechanisms are often provided by a
particular kind of firm—a hierarchy with a manager at the
top. 34
Creative collaborators, however, will find firm structures
more difficult to design. The problem they face is how to
monitor or control teams when the members are providing
inseparable contributions that are difficult to observe. 35 To
solve this problem, creative collaboration requires (more so
than other endeavors) either (1) a special monitoring
mechanism that can compensate non-verifiable effort or (2) a
special enforcement mechanism that can reward or punish
entire teams based on output. 36 As explained below, this is
because the nature of a creative input is that it is hard to
define and measure. It is hard to observe—and even harder
to verify—whether each writer in a group jointly writing a
novel contributed her best ideas and efforts. Or whether a
pair of actors put in their best effort rather than hold back
because they do not like the director’s style. Or whether the
members of a band brought the right energy level to a stage
performance.
The organizational solution to these team production
problems can take one of two general forms. First, the
creative inputs may hire a manager who closely monitors
each input to detect shirking. 37 Alternatively, where even a
monitor cannot observe effort, the creative inputs may hire a
U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1649 (2009); Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of
Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (2011); Érica Gorga & Michael
Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure:
Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1123
(2007).
33 Coase, supra note 11; Williamson, supra note 11.
34 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11; Coase, supra note 11; Williamson
supra note 11.
35 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. See also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 29; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L.
REV. 1683 (2014).
36 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
37 Alchian & Demsetz, supra, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Casey & Sawicki, supra
note 6.
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manager who measures the team’s total output, and enforces
penalties or rewards depending on whether that output
passed some threshold. 38
Formal law can, in limited circumstances, facilitate these
structures and the creative collaborations they serve to some
degree. We have explored this point in prior work. 39 But
formal law is not the only factor influencing the design of
such organizational structures. 40 Indeed, it is not even the
most important. Rather, the limitations on formal law as an
organizational device in the production of copyrightable
works create a vast organizational negative space where
formal law has no (or at most severely limited) influence.
The existence of robust collaboration in the creative
industries despite this negative space suggests that there
are informal rules at work. If that is the case, and we think
it is, the next steps are to identify and evaluate those
informal rules. We do so in the following parts.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION AND THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF FORMAL LAW

In this Part we explore how informal rules can address
the organizational challenges of creative collaboration. We
first introduce the organizational challenges and then
examine potential solutions. We show that while the
managerial hierarchy of a firm can sometimes organize
creative collaborative activity, in this realm the law
necessary to support such organization is significantly
limited.
A. The Challenges of Creative Collaboration
Suppose that two authors—Jane and Toni—wish to
jointly write a novel. Four factors will affect their ability to
collaborate: observability, verifiability, allocation, and
certainty. 41 The more these factors are present the easier it

See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL. J. ECON. 324
(1982); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
39 Id. at 1721-38 (showing how derivate rights law can create a reward
mechanism that facilitates team collaboration and how work-made-forhire and joint-works doctrine can either facilitate or hinder collaboration
depending on specific design).
40 Balganesh, supra note 29; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29..
41 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
38
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will be for the authors to collaborate. But these factors tend
to be absent in creative activities.
First, it is difficult for each author to observe the effort of
the other. If Jane sees Toni sitting in a coffee shop, she
cannot easily know whether Toni is simply daydreaming or,
instead, is thinking hard about how to use prose to convey a
character’s insanity. As a result, Jane cannot effectively
punish Toni for failing to put forth the effort she promised to
exert.
Second, it is difficult for anyone to verify the level of each
author’s performance. Jane cannot demonstrate to a court
that Toni has been keeping her best prose to herself rather
than putting it into their joint novel. 42
Third, the result of their collaboration—a novel—will
resist attempts to allocate or assign output value to the
separate inputs from the respective authors. If a scene in the
novel is excellent, it will be difficult to know whether its
excellence is attributable to the person who first drafted it,
to the one who edited it, to the one who wrote the preceding
scene, to the one who thought up the setting for the scene,
and so on.
Finally, the potential value of their collaboration is
uncertain. Because the work is creative, it will be hard to
predict in advance how much it could possibly be worth. 43 As
a result, the parties cannot simply agree to produce a novel
of a given value. 44
B. The Role of Managers
Because observability, verifiability, allocation, and
certainty are lacking, Jane and Toni will find it difficult to
collaborate on their own. Instead, they might try to organize
their efforts by hiring a manager. 45 Rather than relying on
price signals (or their own good will) to allocate resources,
Jane and Toni can create a hierarchy with a manager at the
top. 46 In this hierarchy, perhaps the manager can add to the
work’s observability or verifiability. The manager can closely
monitor Jane and Toni in an attempt to determine whether
Observability and verifiability are not necessarily coextensive. In some
cases, one author may have observed the other’s laziness but be unable
to verify it to an outsider like a court.
43 Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 333, 363-64 (2012).
44 Id.
45 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1701-12.
46 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11.
42
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either is shirking, and to document that shirking. 47 This can
work if the reason that Jane and Toni could not observe was
because they were busy creating inputs, or because
individuals vary in their skill at observing others.
In many creative endeavors, though, the lack of
observability stems not from the limitation on monitoring
resources or skill, but from the inherent nature of the
creative work itself. Not even the most diligent or skilled
monitor can distinguish daydreaming from creative
thought. 48
Where no one—including the manager—can observe or
verify the creative inputs, the manager still has a role to
play. The manager can enforce penalties (or rewards) on
both Jane and Toni if their joint output is below (or above) a
threshold. These rewards provide a substitute for
monitoring.
If Toni and Jane each benefits from shirking, but a
manager cannot observe or verify who shirked, the manager
can still punish the entire team whenever the project is
unsuccessful. If the entire team is punished when the end
product is unsatisfactory, Toni and Jane will have an
incentive to perform. The punishment eliminates the value
for anyone tempted to shirk. 49
This role requires some level of certainty about what is a
good product and what is a bad product. Importantly,
though, that certainty need not exist ex ante. The manager
may be able to enforce penalties based on a threshold that is
only known after production is complete. This avoids the
need to spend prohibitive sums predicting and planning for
countless contingencies, as would be required of a team
relying on formal contract law.
For example, imagine a blockbuster movie is set to
release next summer. The threshold for a “good” opening
weekend turns on the state of the economy, the state of the
movie industry, the weather, and many other factors that
cannot be known when the creative inputs are initially
contracting to work on the movie, or even during

Id.
That may one day change. See Siyuan Liu, et al, Neural Correlates of
Lyrical Improvisation: An fMRI Study of Freestyle Rap, 2 Scientific
Reports (Nov 15, 2012) (suggesting the possibility of technology to detect
brain waves associated with creative activity).
49 Holmström, supra note 51.
47
48
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production. 50 After the opening weekend has passed, many
of these factors will become known. The manager can use
that knowledge to retroactively reward or punish the team.
If the team members know that the manager will use laterrevealed information to allocate rewards and enforce
penalties, they know that they will be compensated in
proportion to the relative success of the team. They will be
punished or rewarded based on the value the team added
and not based on the fortuities of the weather. The manager
can thus effectively elicit effort on the collaborative work.
To summarize the point, creative inputs face a
monitoring challenge when collaborating. By organizing into
a managerial hierarchy, the inputs can prevent shirking.
The manager who can observe will be able to police effort.
The manager who can reward will be able to align incentives
without observation. 51 The manager retains the residual
claim, which grants her the power to reward, punish, and
reallocate. 52
C. Why Formal
Collaboration

Law

Is

Ineffective

in

Organizing

Managerial oversight is, however, imperfect. Neither
contract rights nor property rights can completely allocate
control over creative collaboration. 53 This is true because the
four factors discussed above (observability, verifiability,

One could imagine a contract that contemplates these possibilities.
But a contract covering the infinite possible states of the world would be
costly to draft and negotiate. Such negotiation, even if theoretically
possible, would be prohibitively expensive. For practical purposes, then,
we can assume such a contract cannot be written.
51 In its pure form, this structure demands that the manager must not be
an input provider. Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL.
J. ECON. 324, 338 (1982). In practice, the level of managerial input is
likely a factor that impacts the effectiveness of the manager. In the
creative context, it may also be that the manager provides non-creative
inputs.
52 In the copyright context, this suggests that the law’s focus on
authorship to determine ownership and control is misguided. It also
suggests that post-production rights like derivative works may serve
reward functions that can be used to facilitate collaboration on the
original work. See generally Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
53 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1690-1700; Anthony J. Casey, Mind
Control: Firms and the Production of Ideas, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
(2012).
50
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allocation and certainty) are often scarce in creative
collaboration. 54
With contracts about creativity, for instance, parties will
often lack the ability to observe or verify outcomes. When
that is true, they will find it difficult to write a contract by
which a manager can oversee efforts. A contractual right to
require a creative input’s best idea is not enforceable when
the relative quality of the idea cannot be observed, verified,
or predicted. Similarly, a contract term that requires a
collaborator to be a “team player” is particularly hard to
enforce when the team is engaged in creating things like
movie scenes, characters for a story, or character chemistry
in a play. 55
Management through property rights can be even more
difficult. Property rights are generally thought to facilitate
organization where one input provider or manager can take
ownership of the crucial assets. 56 This gives that person
residual control over those assets and, thus over the project.
Using that control, the manager can direct other input
providers, and then punish and reward collaboration
through profits from the project 57 or through access to the
project. 58
As a preliminary matter, if all inputs in the collaboration
are creative ideas, managers may have no property rights to
control because copyright does not extend to ideas. 59
Without property rights, the manager has no access or
control rights that she can wield as a carrot or a stick to

For an interesting analysis of the observability and certainty problems
in a creative industry, see Robert R. Faulkner & Andrew B. Anderson,
Short-term Projects and Emergent Careers: Evidence from Hollywood, 92
AM. J. SOC. 879, 885 (1987) (describing the connection between “means
and ends” in film as “obscure and uncertain,” comparing the film
industry to gambling and wildcat oil drilling, and providing examples of
the uncertainty filmmakers face).
55 Casey, supra note 53.
56 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1690-1700 (summarizing a basic
property-rights theory of firms).
57 Holmström, supra note 51.
58 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm,
113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998) (presenting an access-based theory of firms
and property rights).
59 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea . . .
embodied in such work”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding
that copyright law protects expression, not the underlying ideas).
54
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encourage optimal performance. 60 Moreover, even if the
manager possesses some property rights relevant to the
creative collaboration (in complementary assets, for
example), those rights will provide little protection to a
manager-owner who cannot observe inputs, allocate outputs,
or predict outcomes. The threat to withhold property or
access to property as a punishment for lack of collaborative
effort is of little value when the manager cannot observe,
verify, or allocate levels of collaborative effort in the first
place.
At best, imperfect mechanisms of rewards and
punishments can be cobbled together through a combination
of contract and property rights. Thus, for example,
derivative works rights—if allocated to a team manager—
might serve as a reward that can be doled out ex post to
encourage collaboration. 61 The manager can use the promise
of inclusion in future derivative projects as a carrot. But
these reward systems will be imprecise and depend on
conditions that are not universally present. For example, a
reward based on derivative works rights can facilitate
collaboration only when a project is likely to produce
valuable works “based upon” the original work. 62 If the
project is plainly a one-off collaboration, no such reward is
available. Similarly, a team member needs to have a
reasonable expectation that she is a plausible participant in
future projects in order for access to future projects to serve
as a carrot for cooperation on the current project. 63
Thus, a large space exists where formal law cannot
facilitate collaboration. And yet collaboration flourishes and
occupies nearly the whole of the creative market. There will
of course be creative activities that are relatively more or
less collaborative than others. Movies involve massive
collaborations of dozens of people or more. Plays may involve

See Hart & Moore, supra note 11 (developing a theory of the firm that
depends on property rights to allocate residual control over assets);
Rajan & Zingales, supra note 58 (developing a theory of the firm that
depends on property rights to control access to assets).
61 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon
one or more preexisting works”).
63 For example, an actor playing a character that dies in a movie may
have no plausible expectation of being involved in a sequel.
60
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fewer. Books may involve even fewer. 64 The implication of
our analysis is that informal rules will be of greater
importance for the more collaborative activities. But the
bulk of creativity has a significant direct or indirect
collaborative component, suggesting that this role of
informal rules will be a central and core feature of most
creative activity.
III.

MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING INFORMAL RULES

We suggest that there exists a set of informal rules that
facilitates or substitutes for the role of a manager in
organizing creative collaboration. At a high level of
generality, these informal rules may include imperatives
such as (1) do not shirk; (2) do not withhold ideas that could
contribute to the project; and (3) do not appropriate to
yourself ideas suggested by others. 65 Mechanisms that
punish violations of (or reward compliance with) these rules
can make it easier to organize creative collaborations by
punishing team members who do not perform or by making
it easier for the managers to identify team members who are
likely to perform in the first instance.
Informal rules only work if mechanisms exist to ensure
that behavior complies with them. 66 One possible
mechanism is internalization, in which an individual
ensures her own compliance with the informal rule simply
because she prefers to comply. 67 Of course, the assumption
of full internalization is unrealistic and informal rules are
generally not entirely self-enforcing. Instead, other
mechanisms such as reputation and trust can provide the
Rare indeed is a truly solo author. Even the solo novelist is
collaborating with her community peers, her mentors, her agent, her
editors, and those prior artists who influence her work.
65 The precise specification of the content of these imperatives must
await empirical investigation.
66 There is some debate over the terminology to describe the mechanisms
that transfer informal rules into behavioral regularity. Compare ERIC
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2001); with Richard McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 339
(1997); and with Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens: An
Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1583
(2000). We will simply refer to informal rules as the desired behavior
and mechanisms as anything that makes that behavior more likely. We
explore now what those mechanisms might be.
67 See Cooter, supra note 66, at 158 (explaining that individuals may
have a taste or preference for complying with a norm, thereby placing
intrinsic value on compliance apart from its instrumental value).
64
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avenue for enforcing informal rules. 68 Trust and reputation
are closely related and overlapping but play out in different
ways. In this Part, we explore these mechanisms for
enforcing informal rules in the context of creative
collaboration, and their potential costs.
A. How Managers Can Use Reputation and Trust
1. Reputation
We define reputation as information about a person
obtained from “the collective experience of others who have
previously dealt with [that] person.” 69 Norms-based systems
frequently rely on reputation to enforce rules. 70 Individuals
who violate an informal rule can be subjected to reputational
attacks that directly harm them or affect their standing
among peers. 71
Reputation has several characteristics that make it
particularly valuable for managers facilitating team
production. Managers can coordinate creative production if
they can effectively provide rewards (or enforce penalties)
when a team produces more (or less) than some threshold.
Optimally, the manager will have a supply of rewards that is
not limited by his project budget. 72 In most cases that is not
McAdams, supra note 66, at 350.
Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1377 (2010)
70 See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1815 (describing
reputational attacks as punishment for violation of a norm); Fauchart &
von Hippel, supra note 3, at 193 (describing a famous chef’s attack on a
former employee’s reputation in response to the latter’s violation of an
attribution norm).
71 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3, at 189.
72 The ability to break the budget constraint is important in preventing
renegotiation. Holmström, supra note 38. For example, there is a project
that will produce 39 if three team members perform optimally.
Performance costs 10 each. If anyone shirks the project will earn 33 and
the shirker will have no cost. The shirker gets 11 surplus from shirking
and only 3 surplus from performing. But the other team members get
only 1. To solve this problem the manager has to be able to punish the
team when it earns only 33. The manager can destroy value and reduce
the total payout to 0 when the project earns 33 or less (thus the manager
is not constrained by the actual budget). Now the shirking team member
gets nothing and has an incentive not to shirk. Or the manager could
reward performance by paying out 66 whenever the project produced 39
or more (again the manger is not constrained by the budget). Now the
team members get 12 from performing and have no incentive to shirk. In
most contexts, it is difficult to break out of the budget constraint. But
68
69
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possible (budgets constrain most projects). But reputational
rewards are different. The value (and cost) for reputational
rewards (and penalties) can be drawn from future projects
outside of the manager’s budget. In essence, reputational
rewards can impose no monetary cost on the manager but be
translated into money in later projects when the productive
team member will be able to command a premium from her
future teammates. 73
Reputation also has the benefit of being useful even
where the performance of team members is observable to the
manager, but still unverifiable. The manager can tell the
world that the project failed because team members shirked.
And, as long as the relevant community has some level of
confidence in the manager’s judgment, the inability to verify
the shirking to a court is unimportant. Put simply, the
manager may have to overcome a higher burden of proof and
rely on more limited evidence to convince a judge than to
convince her close-knit circle of peers. The community may
accept the manager’s statement that “Anne was a miserable
actress and impossible to deal with in my last movie,” even
when the manager cannot prove any formal breach of Anne’s
contract. If so, and if Anne is motivated by seeking the
renown of her colleagues (or critics or the public at large),
then she may not shirk even if she would otherwise have a
pecuniary motivation to do so.
Additionally, managers may be able to rely on the
reputation mechanism even in the face of low observability
(as well as low verifiability, certainty, and allocability).
Imagine a project that ex ante has an uncertain outcome.
The effort of each member is unobservable and unverifiable.
Similarly, output value cannot be allocated to inputs. As
long as the manager can recognize project failure ex post,
reputation can still serve to prevent shirking. To see how,
suppose a project requires effort from various team
members. If any one of them shirks, there will be some
amount of failure. Moreover, ex ante, the manager has no
idea how much a successful project will be worth. But after
the fact, the manager can determine whether the project
rewards and penalties enforced through reputation and trust may make
it possible to do so in the world of creative collaboration. See Holmström,
supra note 38, at 338–39.
73 This extends Bengt Holmström’s point that moral hazard in teams can
be avoided if failure can be punished by precluding future membership
in the relationship. See Holmström, supra note 38.
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was a relative failure because previously unknowable
information has become known, 74 like cultural, political, or
other exogenous events that have made the subject matter of
a film unappealing. For example, expectations of what
constitutes a successful debut weekend for a movie opening
next summer might change in response to an exogenous
cultural shift (e.g., Donald Trump makes America great
again) or a weather event (e.g., a hurricane strikes the
northeast). With hindsight, the manager now knows how
much a successful project would have produced and can
judge the teams’ effort based on comparing the outcome to
that metric. 75
If the team performed poorly, the manager can let that be
known. This knock to the team members’ reputation is a
penalty for underperformance. As long as the reputational
stain is high enough and the members know that the
manager can impose the penalty, it will be effective in
discouraging shirking. 76
For any of this to work, the manager’s message to the
community must be relevant and credible. The industry
need not know what it was that made Anne a bad actress,
but it needs to know that there is such a thing as an
objectively good actress and an objectively bad actress.
Different traits will, therefore, be more or less susceptible to
reputational assessment. Several film producers suggested
to us that reputation is especially useful for questions about
being a good “team player” (which includes things like
temperament, cooperation or how the person deals with
Exogenous shifts could also make a movie’s success less impressive.
For example, if a particular genre becomes extremely popular then the
measure of success for movies in that genre might require better
performance than was expected when the project began. We have
suggested elsewhere that a scenario like this may be at play in the movie
industry and might be a factor in the sequel “reboot” phenomenon. Casey
& Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1730-31.
75 For a recent example, consider The Interview, the release of which was
limited by Sony in response to North Korea’s cyberattack on Sony. In
this context, the film may be expected to generate very low revenues,
much lower than would have been expected in the absence of North
Korea’s action.
76 Say C was shirking and only provided 5 in work, and was paid 11 of
the 33 output. If everyone performed C would have been paid 13 of 39
with an effort of 10. Shirking provides 6 in surplus to C. Not shirking
provides 3. As long as the reputation penalty to each team member is
more than 3, reputation will be an effective means of overcoming moral
hazard. For the full theory behind this outcome, Holmström, supra note
51; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
74
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creative management and critique). 77 It appears to be
possible to objectively determine whether someone is a team
player. A manager may be able to observe that sort of
characteristic. Crucially, though she may be unable to
correct for it through monitoring. And it can be very difficult
to verify. Under these conditions, the reputational messages
can be especially important.
All of this suggests that reputation, by creating a
mechanism for punishing and rewarding performance when
contracts and other legal rights fall short, makes it easier for
creators to work in collaborative groups. This, in turn,
provides better information to subsequent managers about
potential new team members. When a creative community
can rely on credible sources of information about an
individual’s potential value in a collaboration, a manager
can more readily make decisions about teammates for future
projects even though the manager has never before worked
with those individuals, and the individuals may never have
worked with each other either. This mixing of teammates
has been correlated with higher quality creative output. 78
2. Trust
Trust 79 is information obtained by an individual’s own
experience in prior dealings with a person. 80 A manager or
The producers viewed themselves as more capable of independently
judging pure talent and relied less on their network for things that
might fall under that rubric.
78 Brian Uzzi & Jarrett Spiro, Collaboration and Creativity: The Small
World Problem, 111 AM. J. SOC. 447 (2005) (arguing that the quality of
the creative output in Broadway musicals is a function of the mixing of
teammates across projects).
79 There are of course many ways to define trust. See generally Lisa
Bernstein, Private Ordering, Social Capital, and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts: A Preliminary Exploration (Feb. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (examining the various theories on the role of
trust and social capital in complex commercial transactions). Common
definitions focus on a belief that a counterparty will not intentionally
cheat or expectations that involved parties will act to each other’s
mutual benefit. Id. We use the word trust consistently with those
definitions but stress the source of the content as the distinguishing
factor between reputation and trust.
80 The exact causes or origins of trust are hard to pin down. But
extensive experimental evidence has established that trust plays an
important role in human interactions, including those in markets.
Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735
(2001) (collecting sources and reviewing the experimental literature);
77
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team member may have first-hand information about
another team member, and can then use that information to
evaluate the person’s suitability for any particular project.
Trust is more effective when you have a limited number
of teammates with whom you will engage in repeated
collaborations. 81 After an initial investment in developing
trust (i.e., getting to know someone), it may be better to
capture the return on that investment over several
collaborations. 82
Like reputation, trust can fill a gap left by a lack of
observability, verifiability, certainty, or allocation. If a team
of three or more input providers fails, those who performed
will distrust other members. This will prevent that team
from existing in that form going forward. Just as reputation
can tell the market the team is bad and its members should
not be hired, a lack of trust can tell the team members
themselves that the team is bad and should not be
continued. All team members lose out on future
membership. If that punishment is strong enough and team
members are aware that it will be applied, it will provide an
incentive against shirking.
Trust in the sense used here—as information derived
from prior interactions with another person—may serve as
the basis for continuing collaborative efforts. Consider this
description of Harvey Weinstein’s strategy when he was
running Miramax’s negotiations to acquire Swingers. The
filmmakers were insisting on control over the final cut—the
right to determine when the film was complete and ready for
distribution. 83 This was an unusual demand from the
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Jillian J. Jordan, Alexander
Peysakhovich, & David G. Rand, Why We Cooperate, in Jean Decety &
Thalia Wheatley, eds., The Moral Brain: Multidisciplinary Perspectives
(MIT Press 2014).
81 In our discussion of talent agents above, we suggested that the agents
were reputation intermediaries. They could of course also be trust
intermediaries. A producer may trust an agent or may know that agent
to be of good reputation. Our interviews suggest that the network is
strong enough that reputation does a lot of work. And thus a producer
will be willing to work with an agent who she does not personally know
if that agent has a strong reputation.
82 Again, our discussions with producers are consistent with this idea. In
particular they appear to value repeat interactions with directors after
they learn they can trust each other.
83 Interviews with producers have suggested a particularly interesting
set of informal rules around final cuts. Producers generally insist on
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filmmakers, especially because they had essentially no track
record. Yet Weinstein and Miramax agreed to relinquish
final cut control over Swingers, with an understanding as
described by one of the key participants in the film:
But this is where the Weinsteins were so
smart. They started getting the idea of
“We’re not just buying the movie, we’re
buying
relationships
with
the
filmmakers. We’re going to be in
business with Jon Favreau. We’re going
to be in business with Vince Vaughn.
We’re going to be in business with Doug
Liman. And if we ever want to do
anything in the future with these guys,
we’ve got this over their heads to say,
‘Hey, we started you out.’” It’s just really,
really smart business. 84
A possible inference from the language “if we ever want to
do anything in the future with these guys, we’ve got this
over their heads” is that the Weinsteins were signaling their
ability and willingness to punish violations of their trust by
extracting concessions in future projects. 85 The flip side of
this is that the Weinsteins’ experience with Favreau,
Vaughn, and Liman could facilitate future business with
them—a good final cut on Swingers would make the
Weinsteins more likely to allow them similar creative
control over future projects. Producers have an interest in
developing a relationship with successful filmmakers that
can lead to future projects. And the personal connections
retaining final cut rights, but they vary widely in the extent to which
they exercise those rights. Production companies with a reputation for
heavy-handed final cuts face a challenge in attracting talented writers,
directors, and actors. One producer also suggested that this was an area
where agents played a strong intermediary role collecting and
communicating reputational information about the use of the final cut
right. The noteworthy point is that the norms play a much larger role
than any contract terms.
84 Alex French & Howie Kahn, So Money: An Oral History of Swingers,
GRANTLAND (Jan. 22, 2014), http://grantland.com/features/an-oralhistory-swingers/.
85 We might wonder how the Weinsteins could extract such concessions;
after all, in future deals, the filmmakers would presumably be free to
negotiate with any production company. One partial answer to this
puzzle may be found in the relationship between trust and reputation.
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that might make that relationship strong can be more
valuable than specific terms in a contract or even financial
compensation on the current project.
The line between trust and reputation is, of course,
blurry. For example, the line—“if we ever want to do
anything in the future with these guys, we’ve got this over
their heads to say, ‘Hey, we started you out’”—could be read
not only as an explicit statement regarding the trust the
Weinsteins were vesting in the filmmakers, but also as a
threat to apply reputational penalties if Favreau, Vaughn,
or Liman did not perform on this or future projects. If there
is a norm of loyalty, a reputation for shunning the studio
that gave you enormous freedom and got you started might
hurt a filmmaker’s future prospects. The Weinsteins could
talk to other Hollywood producers and tell a plausible story
that the filmmakers acted unfairly if, after getting final-cut
control on their first film, they later played hardball or
shirked on subsequent projects. On the other hand, the
statement might be assuming only that individuals simply
feel an internal duty of loyalty. For our purposes, the key
observation, however, is simply that the bonds of this
agreement were informal rules of some form rather than
formal legal obligations.
3. The costs associated with reputation and trust
One disadvantage of reputation as a mechanism for
enforcing informal rules of collaboration is that its use
favors generic projects. An input provider’s reputation for
performing idiosyncratic tasks is not valuable. To be useful,
reputation must provide information about tasks that will be
useful to future projects. Work that does not provide
information applicable to other projects does not produce
useful reputational information.
This suggests that the more generic a project is, the more
future value (in terms of useable reputational information) it
will generate. Repeat play and generic projects will be
disproportionately favored because the possibility of doling
out reputational rewards does not exist to the same extent
for one-off and idiosyncratic projects. Thus, a generic project
of low value might be favored over a unique project of high
value. 86 Call this the Marvel hypothesis. 87
In a sense, reputation produces a contingent future value that can be
doled out as a reward to keep the team together. Counterintuitively, the
future contingent value of reputation can be more useful than the
86
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We must also consider the possibility that informal rules
may be a barrier to entry in a way that strong intellectual
property rights are not. 88 Informal rules may systematically
treat new entrants worse than incumbents. Indeed, the fact
that informal rules are maintained by incumbents gives us a
prima facie reason to suspect that they will be designed to
protect incumbents’ positions against entry. 89 For example,
recall that reputation might be used to inform the selection
of members in a team. People working in the field will use
information gleaned from a prospective team member’s past
performances with other teams to guide their decisions
whether to add the prospective member to the team for a
new project. But a new entrant’s reputation will be thin—
she will have had no (or few) past performances that others
could rely on in deciding whether to add her to their teams.
At least until a new entrant is able to build a reputation, she
will find it more difficult to find attractive projects to work
on than will established players. 90
These barriers may also reduce movement across sectors
of industry creating silos or pockets of production types.
Film talent may stay in film, and television talent may stay
in television because information about inputs does not
easily transfer across different kinds of projects, even when
there are surface similarities in the work required (e.g.,
acting on a television show and acting in film). Moreover,
new talent faces an enormous obstacle to entering the
industry because it is hard to generate and distribute
credible information about them. In many situations, then,
we should worry that the best talent for a particular job is

present value of the project itself because the reputation can be used to
bind the team in a way that the present value of the project cannot.
87 See, e.g., Peter Suderman, Superhero Movies Have Become Too
Formulaic. Deadpool Makes a Case for Breaking the Mold, VOX (Feb. 17,
2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/2/17/11021144/deadpoolsuperhero-movies-formulaic.
88 Cf. Perzanowski, supra note 3, at 581-84 (explaining how norms
against copying custom tattoo designs function as barriers to entry).
89 Perzanowski, supra note 3, at nn. 596 & 599; Barnett, Private
Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251 (2004).
90 There is some data suggesting this barrier is significant in film. See,
e.g, Faulkner & Anderson, supra note 54 (providing evidence that past
credits increase the chances of future work and describing the film
industry as a “rich get richer” environment).
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passed over simply because managers have better
information about other talent. 91
Perhaps the most pernicious risk of informal rules is
their power to entrench biases. Formal law can be
challenged in courts or through legislation. Informal rules
are often self-executing or rely on the collective action of a
community as a whole. Where self-executing rules are
biased, they will be difficult to dislodge. Similarly, where the
rules are enforced through collective action of a community,
the existing biases of that community will dictate the
manner of enforcement. In either case, the victim of bias
cannot appeal to a higher or neutral authority.
Some biases may be benign but others—particularly
those based on race, gender, sexual orientation or similar
categories—can be harmful to the victims of the bias, to the
industry, and to society as a whole. These biases may
manifest themselves directly or through more subtle
channels.
Direct biases are easy to identify. An industry that
compiles its teams based on reputation will perpetuate
biased team structures. 92 For example, some evidence
suggests that film crews are overwhelmingly (77.4%) male. 93
Thus, the pool of people who have any reputation as film
crewmembers is going to be overwhelmingly male. Which
will likely lead to a persistent skew toward male talent.
An example of a more subtle indirect bias resulting from
informal rules relates to the myth of the sole creator
discussed above. 94 This may seem on its face to be just about
the nature of creation and not the identity of the creators.
The norm might be an anti-collaboration norm or it might be
a means of concentrating control of collaboration. But the
bias problem goes deeper. There is significant evidence that
this myth contains and enforces gender bias. 95
See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of how bias can play into these
decisions.
92 See DARNELL HUNT & ANA-CHRISTINA RAMON, 2015 HOLLYWOOD
DIVERSITY REPORT (2015) (documenting widespread underrepresentation
of minorities and women in the entertainment industry).
93
Stephen
Follows,
Gender
Within
Film
Crews,
https://stephenfollows.com/reports/Gender_Within_Film_Crewsstephenfollows_com.pdf (July 2014) (providing data on film crews on the
2,000 highest grossing films from 1994 to 2013).
94 Others might include norms about the quality of certain types of art
such as fan fiction or romance novels. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 5.
95 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 5 (collecting sources and noting the
existence of gender bias in broader norms within the copyright space).
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And the fact has not been lost on those in the creative
industries. In the music industry, Taylor Swift, Solange
Knowles, and Bjork have all been the targets of one-sided
critiques of female artists for not producing their work all on
their own. 96 A recent controversy in the music industry
highlighted the pervasive and gendered nature of the solecreator story. Kanye West challenged Beck to give his 2015
Album of the Year Grammy to Beyoncé because, according to
West, Beyoncé possessed more “artistry.” Within a few days,
Beck defenders argued that he was more deserving of the
award than Beyoncé because “Beyoncé used a team of 25
writers and 16 producers. Beck just one: himself.” Some
went on to note that Beck even “sang and played 17
instruments [while] Beyoncé [merely] sang.” 97 The
implication was that Beck was a real artist because he was a
sole creator. As this meme spread, a backlash arose that
rightly criticized it for misunderstanding the meaning of
artistry and importing the sole-creator myth with its sexist
undertones. 98
One final consideration is the effect of reputation
penalties on hold up. Threats to breach or terminate a
contract can create valuable incentives for parties to
perform. On the other hand, they can also create hold-up
value if one party threatens to breach after the other has
committed time and resources to relationship-specific
investments. Reputation is no different. A threat to destroy
someone’s reputation is as much a hold-up threat as a threat
to terminate a supply contract. This is to say that just as
See Forrest Wickman, It’s Not Just Bjork: Women are Tired of Not
Getting Credit for Their Own Music, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2015).
97 See, e.g., Peter Vincent, Grammys 2015 Comment: Beck Trumps
Beyoncé for Artistry, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/grammys/grammys-2015comment-beck-trumps-beyonce-for-artistry-20150210-13afqb.html.
Similarly, BuzzFeed provided five reasons that Beck was better than
Beyoncé, including as number three (under the heading “His artistry”) a
list of the 25 writers on Beyoncé’s album next to Beck’s name all by
itself, and as number four (under the heading “His artistry (again)”) a
picture of a fourteen instruments that Beck played on his album next to
a lone microphone for Beyoncé. Jack Shepherd, 5 Reasons Why Beck Beat
(Feb.
9,
2015),
Beyoncé,
BUZZFEED
http://www.buzzfeed.com/expresident/why-beck-beatbeyonce#.xnWKM13y3.
98 See, e.g., Darren Levin, Stop Questioning Beyoncé’s Artistry to Make a
LOUDER,
(Feb.
11,
2015)
Point
about
Beck,
FASTER
http://www.fasterlouder.com.au/features/41866/Stop-questioningBeyonces-artistry-to-make-a-point-about-Beck.
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contracts are incomplete, so too are mechanisms for
enforcing informal rules.
B. The Special Case of Creative Collaboration Managed
by External Informal Rules
In previous work we demonstrated that ownership and
authorship are often conflated in ways that cloud analysis of
copyright law. 99 The key question for the formal law of
copyright is who owns the creative products. Doctrines that
tie ownership to authorship misunderstand the nature of
collaborative creativity and the role that ownership plays in
creating a hierarchy to facilitate collaboration. 100 We thus
argued that the law ought to emphasize ownership and
control, even at the potential expense of traditional notions
of authorship. 101
Here we go further—even legal ownership and control
often cannot be neatly linked. Reputation and trust
frequently control creative production regardless of who
owns the creative product. Where that is the case, formal
law may not be playing much of a role at all in allocating
control. Instead, when control cannot be found in
hierarchical firms, management is disaggregated such that
important managerial functions are found in networks of
relationships created and governed by informal rules. 102
Thus, in addition to offering tools for a manager
overseeing a hierarchical creative collaboration, reputation
and trust might themselves allow for informal rules to
substitute for the role of a manager in collaborative
endeavors. While the team production theory of the firm
emphasizes the need for a manager to observe inputs or
enforce reward and punishment agreements when market
contracting is not possible, it is plausible that under certain
conditions, a manager is not required at all. Instead,
informal rules backed by reputation and trust perform the

Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
See Casey & Sawicki, note 6; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29;
Balganesh, supra note 35.
101 See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1713-26.
102 On network governance theories in general see Bernstein, supra note
79; Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, & Stephen Borgatti, A General
Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social
Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGM’T. REV. 911 (1997).
99

100
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monitoring or enforcement functions ordinarily performed by
a manager. This creates a form of network governance. 103
The mechanism by which informal rules can substitute
for a managerial hierarchy is as follows: the reputation of
the team as a whole provides the binding mechanism. If a
team never works and collapses in bickering, the world is
likely to see this. Outsiders may have no way of observing or
verifying which team members caused the collapse. But they
do know that the team members did not work well together
or at least that the team failed to produce. This harms the
reputation of all team members, providing an ex post
penalty to the entire group for failure to perform—the team
that produces a bad movie bears a collective reputational
hit. 104 In these scenarios, the manager is not necessary—
informal rules enforced through reputation by a kind of
network governance fill the manager’s role instead. 105
The threat of this industry-imposed reputational penalty
may create an ex ante incentive for all parties to perform
Theories of network governance have been explored deeply in the
management and sociology disciplines but less so in legal scholarship.
Lisa Bernstein has recently provided an analysis of law and network
governance in manufacturing industries. Bernstein, supra note 79. In
part we are making a similar contribution to industries in the copyright
space. Worthy of note is that the framework for network governance is
dramatically different in the two contexts. Where the creative networks
that enforce informal rules are themselves structured and created by
informal networks (contracts do not specify how the network will be
connected or the rules it will follow), Bernstein finds that some
manufacturing industries have complicated contracts that form the
framework and reference points for their network governance. The
network that enforces the informal rules has behind it detailed formal
contracts that provide an idea of what is acceptable behavior. We suspect
that the difference lies in the four factors we have identified throughout
this article. Where uncertainty, observability, verifiability, and
allocation are low (as they are for creative production) it is even difficult
to use formal law and contracting as the backbone for creating or guiding
a network. The same is not true in the manufacturing industries.
104 See Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, supra note 102, at 931-32 (describing
collective sanctions that can be imposed industries including film).
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti describe this phenomenon with an
anecdote about the film failure of Heaven’s Gate. The movie’s
extraordinary failure resulted in a sanction such that virtually the entire
team was excluded from the film industry for some period of time. Id.
Something like this may also explain the career trajectories of some of
the participants involved in other notorious flops like Cutthroat Island
and Batman Forever.
105 A simpler version of this may also encourage positive team behavior
without a manager when the team members fear a trust or reputation
sanction directly from the other members of the team.
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optimally in the collaboration. This can be understood as a
form of the group penalty that Holmström identified as a
prime facilitator of team production. 106 The penalty would be
self-executing and, indeed, may be an example of a penalty
enforcement that can exist without an actual manager in
place.
We do not suggest that such a phenomenon is unique to
copyright. 107 We do, however, suggest that it is particularly
widespread throughout industries regulated by copyright
law. Informal rules flourish when there are thick
relationships with repeated interactions within a given
community.
Expressive
creation
is
pervasively
collaborative—thus requiring such thick relationships with
those repeated and close interactions. 108 And formal law is a
weak tool for facilitating that collaboration. Because
ownership is a construct of formal law that does not track
the relationships at the heart of creative collaborations, it
cannot provide the control rights that are necessary for
organizing productions, even at the core of the copyright
space.
What matters in creative production is actual control,
which cannot be fully allocated by legal ownership or by
contract. Formal law can provide mechanisms that
managers use to increase control on the margins. 109 But it
cannot sufficiently allocate the core of control rights
necessary to create a film, a television show, a play, or
communal folklore.
For example, a contract might say that a producer “owns”
the rights of final cut. That is, formal law grants the
producer the right to decide when the film is done. The
truth, though, is more complex. Perhaps in any given
See Holmström, supra note 51, at 338–39.
Examples of non-integrated non-contractual relationships that
function like a Coasean hierarchy can be found in many industries:
MACCAULEY, supra note 9; ELLICKSON, supra note 9; Bernstein, supra
note 79; Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of
“Team” Production of Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE L. REV. 365
(2015).
108 Others have also suggested that uncertainty and volatility leads to
repeat interactions. See, e.g, Faulkner & Anderson, supra note 54
(providing evidence on the uncertainty of and recurrent relationships in
the film industry). Some of the underlying causes of such uncertainty
can arise from the creative nature of the projects we discuss in this
paper. Id.
109 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1713 (discussions regarding the
derivative works right and work made for hire doctrine).
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instance, a producer can in principle exercise final cut
however she desires. But it is also true that doing so may be
her last act as a producer who has access to any talent in the
film industry. It is then just as true as a practical matter to
say that the film industry or the Hollywood network as a
whole has residual control over the final cut.
This is why a producer who provides creative inputs can
be trusted to act appropriately even though that producer
ostensibly sits at the top of the hierarchical firm making the
film. In reality, the hierarchy has additional levels above
and outside of the firm—the managerial function is
disaggregated, with some elements remaining within the
firm (e.g., allocating revenues generated by the film or
deciding when the film is complete) and others distributed
throughout the community (e.g., allocating reputational
rewards associated with the film or punishing misuse of
final cut authority).
IV.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FORMAL LAW AND
INFORMAL RULES FOR CREATIVE COLLABORATIONS
Informal rules do not, of course, operate in isolation.
Even in contexts where informal rules generally facilitate
creative collaborations—as we think they do in the
American television and film industries—there will
nonetheless be particular instances where, for one reason or
another, collaborations fail. When they do, formal law and
informal rules at the intersection of authorship, ownership,
and control may attempt to mediate the conflict. In this
Part, we apply our analysis to illustrate the possible
interactions between formal law and informal rules, and to
identify some tradeoffs involved in regulating the
organization of creative collaboration.
A. When Informal Rules Fail: Garcia and Merkin
Copyright law contains two primary mechanisms to deal
with creative works that are the product of contributions
from multiple creative inputs. The default mechanism is the
joint works rule, which applies to works “prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.” 110 In these instances, each “author” is a co-owner of

110

17 U.S.C. § 101.
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the copyright in the work. 111 Parties may, however, contract
out of this co-ownership default through the work made for
hire doctrine, which provides that contributors to a creative
collaboration may contractually assign their authorship (and
resulting ownership), thus allowing parties to opt into
consolidated authorship, ownership, and control. 112
Difficult problems, however, arise when the parties fail to
opt into the work made for hire regime, and the joint works
rule does not cleanly apply. Among other scenarios, this can
occur when creative inputs disagree about what, precisely,
the “work” is. 113 The director and producer of a film may, for
example, disagree about whether a given scene should be
included in the completed version. In such a case, there will
be two films, one including the director’s scene and the other
including the producer’s scene.
Formal copyright law may have trouble resolving these
disagreements in a satisfying way because it is designed on
the assumption that the parties agree what the “work” is. 114
Formal copyright law permits only the “author” of the work
to decide whether a particular scene makes it in. But it
determines who is the author by looking to who has the
authority to decide whether a particular scene makes it in.
The question in the toughest cases is which of two plausible
works—each with its own supporters within the
collaboration—prevails. Formal law becomes circular when
the question of which version prevails is answered by
determining who decides which version prevails and the
question of who decides which version prevails depends on
which version is being assessed.
To see how this problem plays out, consider two recent
cases presenting precisely those scenarios. In Garcia v.
17 U.S.C. § 201.
17 U.S.C. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
113 For another scenario, see Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th
Cir. 2000). In that case, the question was not which of two competing
versions prevailed, but who was entitled to control the value of an
agreed-upon version. Id. at 1230. Like Garcia and Merkin, though, the
court dismissed the copyrightable contributions of one of the creative
inputs to the collaboration in favor of consolidating control through
formal law. Id. at 1236. And it similarly implies that the work made for
hire doctrine’s requirement of an agreement in the case of non-employee
contributors is a dead letter.
114 Defining the “work” for purposes of copyright law is a complex and
undertheorized problem. For an interesting analysis revealing the
complexities, see Margot Kaminski & Guy Rub, Framing Copyright
(draft on file with the authors).
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Google, 115 Cindy Garcia was cast for a cameo in what she
thought was an action-adventure film titled Desert Warrior;
it turned out that the film was “an anti-Islam polemic called
Innocence of Muslims.” 116 Garcia’s lines had been dubbed
over so she appeared to say “Is your Mohammed a child
molester?” 117 When the film was released on YouTube,
Garcia received death threats, and she sued the filmmaker
and Google for copyright infringement, seeking an injunction
preventing the distribution of any version of the film that
included her performance. 118 Garcia argued that she was the
sole author of a standalone copyright in her “performance.”
What she sought, in effect, was the ability to define the work
as consisting solely of the scene in which she participated;
the director, Mark Basseley Youssef, sought to define the
work as the larger film Innocence of Muslims, including the
scene in which Garcia participated. 119
The Ninth Circuit en banc sided with Youssef’s definition
of the work. 120 Apparently adopting the Copyright Office’s
view that the production of a motion picture results in only
one copyrightable work, 121 the court noted first that a
“performance” does not fall within the statutory list of
examples of “works of authorship.” 122 Moreover, Garcia did
not contribute more than a “minimal level of creativity or
originality” when she performed her part. 123 As a result, her
performance was not a “work of authorship” to which
copyright might attach. 124 And to the extent that anything
incorporating her performance was a “work” entitled to
copyright protection, she was not its author because she was
not the person under whose authority that larger work was
fixed. 125
Note, however, the circularity. The underlying question
the court had to resolve was whether Garcia or Youssef had
the right to decide whether Innocence of Muslims would
786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 737.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 737-38.
119 Youssef himself did not participate in the litigation. But we can take
the version of the film he released on YouTube as the version of the work
that he deemed final.
120 Id. at 740.
121 Id. at 741.
122 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102.
123 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742-43.
124 Id. at 741-43.
125 Id. at 743-44.
115
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include Garcia’s scene. In order to answer that question, the
court had to identify the author of the work. But it could not
identify the author without first deciding what was the
relevant work. 126
The Garcia court’s holding is perhaps sensible in the
context of a five-second cameo performance. It seems
untenable to conclude, as the dissent apparently implies,
that every contributor in a film, no matter how small the
contribution, has joint control over the final product. 127 That
would be a strange rule even if it were simply a default
where parties can opt out. The more efficient rule is the one
we think parties would overwhelmingly adopt: no control to
the minor actor who speaks two lines for five seconds.
But the court’s reasoning is problematic for at least two
reasons. First, as the dissent points out, the court suggests
that a filmed scene for a film is not a copyrightable
“work.” 128 It does not, however, tell us at what point in
filming or editing something transforms from a separate
input into the joint output: the ultimate work itself. Does
this mean, the dissent asks, that every outtake of a film and
every draft chapter of a book are fair game for copying? That
cannot be true. 129
Second, the court’s holding that Garcia is not entitled to
any copyright interests in her work leaves little room for the
work made for hire doctrine. 130 In the presence of an
appropriate agreement, that doctrine would take copyright
ownership out of the actor’s hands and put it in the

If the work were a version of Innocence of Muslims without Garcia’s
scene, then Youssef could not have been the author because he wanted
that scene in. If the relevant work was – as the court ultimately viewed
it – a version of Innocence of Muslims including Garcia’s scene, Garcia
could not be the author—after all, her argument was that she did not
want her scene in the film, and her inability to excise it from the work as
a whole was what led her to seek relief in court.
127 Id. at 743.
128 Id. at 749-50 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
129 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or
phonorecord for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time
constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate
work.”)
130 786 F.3d at 751 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that “[a]ctors
usually sign away their rights when contracting to do a movie, but
Garcia didn’t and she wasn’t Youssef’s employee”).
126

37

director’s (or producer’s). 131 But here there was no work
made for hire agreement, and ownership is still being taken
out of the actor’s hands and put into the director’s. The
Garcia court’s analysis thus treats Garcia’s work as if it
were subject to a work made for hire agreement, even
though it plainly was not. What then is the doctrine doing
for film actors? Perhaps none. But that would render the
statutory requirement of an agreement (for non-employee
contributors like Garcia) a dead letter.
The difficulty then is that both the majority and the
dissent present untenable options. Formal law gives us two
possibilities. First, input providers are not creating
copyrightable works, in which case those providers get
nothing. Second, every input provider is an author with
control over any final product that includes the inputs.
Those two possible rules replicate neither the intent of
parties involved in most film relationships nor any
hypothetical efficient transaction.
The reason for the disconnect is that most relationships
in the film industry have deep and nuanced terms that are
set by and enforced through informal rules. And the formal
law cannot do better than those rules. It can only do worse—
which is precisely why the parties opt for informal rules in
the first place. Formal contracts are difficult to write and
judicial enforcement is insufficient when the contract is
about creativity and the key aspects of the performance
suffer from an absence of observability, verifiability,
allocability, and certainty.
We do not mean to suggest that the arrangements in
Garcia were part of the normal film industry. Perhaps it is
precisely because Garcia and Youssef were operating so far
outside the reach of the industry’s informal rules that the
dispute arose. But the formal law that is developed in the
case now nominally applies as the formal law of the normal
film industry, and that is what makes the reasoning
potentially harmful.
Indeed, the implications of Garcia become more difficult
to resolve if they are applied to a standard Hollywood
See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The doctrine can also apply in the absence of an
agreement to scenarios in which an employee performs work within the
scope of employment, but those kinds of scenarios would not apply in the
ordinary film context. See CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (limiting
the application of the work made for hire doctrine in the absence of an
agreement to scenarios in which “a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency”).
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context. After Garcia v. Google, the Second Circuit in 16
Casa Duse v. Merkin faced just such a scenario. 132 Robert
Krakovski, the owner, operator, and principal of 16 Casa
Duse LLC, bought the rights to the screenplay Heads Up. 133
He asked Alex Merkin to direct the film. 134 Throughout
production, Krakovski and Merkin negotiated a work made
for hire contract, but they ultimately could not agree. 135
Krakovski continued pursuing one version of the film, while
Merkin had an alternate version. 136
Krakovski then sued Merkin, seeking a declaratory
judgment that 16 Casa Duse was not liable for copyright
infringement and that Merkin had no copyright interest in
the film. 137 The parties agreed that Merkin was not a joint
author of the Krakovski version and that the work made for
hire provision did not apply. 138 The case thus explicitly
posed the question what, precisely, is the work of authorship
to which copyright protection attaches?

791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015). Because the informal rules are so
pervasive and powerful, few disputes involving major industry
participants will reach the point at which a court of appeals issues an
opinion. Indeed, most of the disputes will be resolved within the industry
itself. Still, in at least some cases, the disputes will at least spill into the
public eye, even if they do not reach the courts of appeals. For some
recent examples, see Eriq Gardner, Director of Nina Simone Film Sues
over Production Company’s Hijacking (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, Mar. 4, 2016, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/director-nina-simone-film-sues-704230
(describing
filmmaker’s
allegations that production company improperly took control of editing
film); ‘London Fields’ Premier in Toronto Troubled by Creative Rift, N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
15,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/business/media/london-fieldspremiere-toronto-troubled-by-creative-rift.html (describing fight between
director and producer regarding which version of the film is suited for
distribution). For an older example, see the disputes regarding Blade
Runner. Will McCarthy, Do Filmgoers Dream of Director’s Cuts?, SCI FI
WEEKLY,
Oct.
15,
2007,
http://web.archive.org/web/20090319034524/http://www.scifi.com/sfw/col
umn/sfw17153.html. The judicial resolution of cases like Garcia and
Merkin will be problematic because they will shape how other disputes
are resolved by informal rules even when they do not reach the courts.
133 791 F.3d at 251.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 251-52.
137 Id. at 253.
138 Id. at 255-56.
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Merkin offered two possibilities: his directorial
contributions or the existing film footage. 139 For our
purposes, the second is of particular interest. 140 At the time
of the litigation, there were at least two, and perhaps three,
versions of the movie: (1) the raw footage shot by Merkin; (2)
an edited version completed by an editor retained by
Krakovski; (3) and (perhaps) an edited version cut by
Merkin. 141 The court’s analysis appeared to treat the raw
footage as the locus of whatever copyright protection arose
from Merkin’s and Krakovski’s collaboration. 142 According to
the court, because none of the multiple author scenarios
contemplated by the Copyright Act applied, the answer to
who owned that copyright in the raw footage turned on who
was the “dominant author.” 143
That inquiry, however, would not be answered by
investigating which of the putative authors occupied the
mastermind role with respect to creative decisions; instead,
the Merkin court looked for which of the parties could best
be understood as the manager in the team production sense.
Thus, although “Merkin exercised a significant degree of
control over many of the creative decisions” including
“decisions related to camera work, lighting, blocking, and
actor’s wardrobe, makeup, and dialogue delivery,” Krakovski
prevailed because he “initiated the project; acquired the
rights to the screenplay; selected the cast, crew and director;
controlled the production schedule; and coordinated (or
attempted to coordinate) the film’s publicity and release.” 144
Krakovski appears to have made none of the creative
decisions we typically associate with the author’s role in the
Id. at 255.
As to directorial contributions, the Merkin court reasoned that
individual creative contributions to a collaborative work could not be
“works of authorship” entitled to protection. This analysis was based on
statutory interpretation that was neither obvious nor inevitable and
further reflects courts’ tendencies to concentrate authorship, ownership,
and control. Because it largely tracks the Garcia court’s analysis of
Garcia’s claim to copyright in her performance, we set it aside here.
141 Id. at 251-53.
142 Id. at 259 (noting Merkin’s contention that “he and not Casa Duse
owns all copyright interests in the ‘raw film footage’” and recognizing
that “the film footage is subject to copyright protection” and reasoning
that the “unedited film footage” was the “portion of [the work] that ha[d]
been fixed at [this] particular time” and proceeding to evaluate “the
ownership of any such copyright”).
143 Id. at 260-61.
144 Id.
139
140
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production of expressive works—he did not write the story,
perform the roles, guide the actors’ in their interpretation of
the text, or decide how to frame a shot. Instead, he did what
a team production manager would do: decide the scope of the
project and determine membership in the team.
The outcome may be a reasonable resolution of the
circumstances in this particular case. But the legal doctrines
that get the court to its outcome are troubling and may
frustrate the parties’ desired relationships if applied in other
cases. The court creates the fiction of a dominant author and
then that label is bestowed on the party exercising the
fewest acts of creative authorship. It must do this to reach
the consolidation of formal ownership and authorship that
formal law insists on, despite the fact that the parties did
not (jointly) desire it nor did they contract for such neat
consolidation on their own.
Underlying these cases is the subtle question of
competing visions of a work. Both Garcia and Merkin
rejected claims to authorship in part because the claimants
did not have the authority to say what the work is. In
Garcia, Cindy Garcia had no ability to say whether her
scene would be part of the film, or even what she would be
saying in that scene. In Merkin, Casa Duse was the one that
determined what story would be told, and that sufficed to
establish its claim to authorship status under formal
copyright law (as well as the ownership and control that
followed).
But this elides the deeper question about what happens
when collaborators disagree about which story is going to be
told. This question lurks beneath the surface of Merkin. If
our focus is on the raw footage, it seems plausible if not
inevitable to think that Krakovski would be the author. The
version edited by Merkin, however, seems of a different
sort—in what way can we view Krakovski as the author of a
version of the film that he did not approve of? Perhaps
Merkin’s version of the film infringes on Krakovski’s, raising
again the old Anderson question of what happens to the
original portions of an unauthorized derivative work. 145 But
it is hard to view Krakovski as the author of a version of the
film that he does not believe should exist at all. Formal law
does not offer a satisfying way out of this puzzle.
B. When Informal Rules Work
145

Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 1989).
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1. Anecdotes from Industry Participants
In most industries where creative collaboration is
pervasive, informal rules will usually work well enough. For
example, several independent film producers have reported
that, at least sometimes, informal rules (and not formal
contract terms) regulate the organization of creative
collaboration. 146 In these cases, rights to ideas were
allocated not by confidentiality agreements and submission
releases, but by reputation—often filtered through
intermediaries in the form of agents and managers—and by
trust. Thus, pitches for proposed films took place informally
between filmmakers and producers who either knew each
other personally or were introduced to each other by a
trusted third party (usually an agent, but sometimes
another producer) who could vouch for the behavior of the
filmmaker.
Similarly, some producers described a system where
performance obligations of actors, writers, and directors
were controlled almost exclusively by industry expectations.
Bad behavior—rejecting suggested revisions without
adequately considering them, allocating insufficient time to
the project, storming off the set, and the like—resulted in
penalties applied through reputation and trust, rather than
through formal legal action. Producers communicated with
each other about which actors work well in teams, which
writers produce weak drafts, and which directors poison the
environment on the set.
Producers themselves were sometimes bound little by
their contracts but greatly by community restraints. Thus,
producers described arrangements where they had the
formal contractual right to final cut (the right to decide
which version of a film is released) but felt that informal
rules prevented them from exercising those rights in all but
the most extreme circumstances. The improper use of final
cut would result in severe reputational penalties and a
resulting inability to attract new talent.
Importantly, the contracts in these cases did not provide
that filmmakers get to decide when a film is done. And they
did not provide that the right transfers to the producers only
The description in the following sections is based on conversations we
have had with producers in the independent film industry and an editor
in the literary incubator industry. Like the reported cases discussed
above, these are anecdotal examples to demonstrate how the
mechanisms we have discussed might work in practice.
146
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in circumstances involving wrongdoing by the filmmaker. 147
But the relationships functioned as if those terms were
included. In this way, an informal rule—and not the formal
law of contract—dictated the most central organization for
creative control. 148
2. Reputation Networks and Agents as Reputation
Intermediaries
The mechanisms we have discussed require strong social
networks. Participants in the film industry cannot rely on
reputation unless reputational information can be
transmitted at a reasonable cost. One producer told us,
unsurprisingly, that much of this is facilitated through
industry relationships that are developed through social
events. 149 We suspect that talent agents are crucial to these
networks.
In cases when a very powerful filmmaker obtains final cut rights,
those rights are often conditioned on the filmmaker satisfying various
obligations; even so, disputes regarding final cut in those instances are
rarely resolved by reference to contractual language. See Tatiana Siegel,
Fade-out on final cut privileges?, VARIETY (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://variety.com/2010/film/news/fade-out-on-final-cut-privileges1118014187/ (quoting a “studio chief” as saying that “Even if you can
find a way that they are in breach (of their contractual delivery terms),
you are more than hesitant to take advantage. Putting aside what the
contract says, you’re not going to take on Baz [Lurhmann] and take on
that PR nightmare.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
148 The producers reported similar attributes in the organization of their
relationships with writers. Our conversations with participants in the
literary-incubator (or book-packaging industry) similarly indicated that
informal rules play crucial roles organizing creative collaborations.
When a group of authors brainstorms ideas for novels, there is a risk
that an author will use the sessions to improve her own ideas and then
defect from the group, taking her ideas with her. Instead, an informal
rule dictates that any ideas disclosed during a session belong to the
group.
149 As he put it: When you are assessing someone’s potential, first you
talk to agents, and then you get on the phone to call your industry
friends, “which are different from your real friends.” The information
gathered from these networks likely have dramatic effects. One producer
told us that a director with whom he worked proved to be extremely
difficult in the editing room. When the producer later received a call
from a colleague interested in hiring the filmmaker, the producer told
him to stay as far away as possible. The filmmaker was not hired. Of
course, nothing is absolute. The same producer told us of a filmmaker
who effectively walked off the set. Although her prior film was widely
lauded, the producer said that this behavior would likely mean that no
producer would hire her. He noted, however, that it was a hard case
147
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Talent agents are often viewed with some skepticism.
Providing the inspiration for such unlikeable characters as
Ari Gold on Entourage, the agents nonetheless appear to
occupy the central role of reputation repositories or
intermediaries. Agents can develop trust with both the
talent and the producers who may hire the talent. In this
way they can connect two players who would otherwise have
no basis for trusting each other.
The intermediary role of the agent can add value in the
following way: A producer may want to know if an actor is
creatively talented and a team player. Evaluating creative
talent depends on accessible information—the actor’s body of
work can be viewed and judged (if producers are expert
evaluators of talent). 150 But evaluating whether an actor is a
team player depends on largely inaccessible information—
the actor’s private interactions with other actors, directors,
and writers cannot be streamed on Netflix.
An agent, however, may specialize in aggregating
information on both characteristics, and for many players.
The agent can access private information about whether
someone is a team player by serving as a trusted repository
for it. An effective agent should be expected to know which
producers can work well with which directors; which writers
work well with micro-managing producers and which work
well when left alone; which directors will work well with
which big talent; and which casting specialists know how to
fill out the rest of the team. And because the agent will work
with an actor (or writer or casting specialist) on all projects,
while a producer will work with the actor on only a subset of
projects (and perhaps only one), the agent is better able to
spread the costs of acquiring information across all of an
actor’s projects. Thus, a producer need only keep in mind
which agents are known to be good.
On the other side of things, the agents can aggregate
information about producers for the talent providers. This
provides both information and a bonding mechanism by
which producers can commit to good behavior. Mistreatment
of talent—even if it is not legally actionable—will lead to a
because the person “might be so good that it is worth taking on the risk
in the future.” In that instance, the talent’s misbehavior had reduced her
value, but perhaps not to zero.
150 This is subject to the constraint that for any given film, value cannot
be easily allocated to a particular input. That said, producers may be
expert allocators, and they may be able to evaluate over an entire body of
work what cannot be done for any given work.

44

report to the agent. The agent can then collect this
information, and either pass it on to others in the industry
or simply refuse to refer top talent to the producer in the
future.
Moreover, the agents can also police the equality of
treatment. While any given actor or director may not know
how her peers are being treating by producers, the agents
have a good sense. If the producer is suggesting conditions
or perks that are not commensurate with industry
standards, the agent will have a sense of this and can push
back on the producers. 151
In all of this, one thing will be conspicuously absent: the
contract term. An agent who gets it wrong will not be sued
for breach. A writer whose draft strikes the wrong tone or
who rejects suggestions out of hand will not be taken to
court. And a producer who abuses final cut will be (largely)
immune from any legal action. But these players all know
that there is a code of conduct with which they are expected
to comply.
This is consistent with what has been found in other
creative industries. Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von
Hippel, for example, describe an instance in which a former
employee of a famous chef “presented one of the chef’s
recipes on TV without proper attribution.” 152 This violated
an informal rule providing that a chef must acknowledge the
original source of a recipe. But the famous chef who created
the recipe did not sue his former employee for violating the
rule; instead, the famous chef sent a letter admonishing the
This looks a lot like network governance and information sharing in
other contexts. See Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, & Stephen
Borgatti, A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions
and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGM’T. REV. 911 (1997). For example,
in manufacturing, firms that make large relationship specific
investments seek ways to bind each other to good behavior. In some
cases, they go to great measures to create vast interconnected networks
of valuable business partnerships that create information channels and
reciprocal threat points. Misbehavior by any one party can lead to a
costly expulsion from the networks. See Lisa Bernstein, Private
Ordering, Social Capital, and Network Governance in Procurement
Contracts: A Preliminary Exploration, (Feb. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (providing an in depth picture and analysis of this
phenomenon). In the film industry, the agent provides the connective
tissue for the network. The information resides in the agent and the
agent has the power to exclude players on either side from the network.
That is not, however, to say that players cannot be excluded in other
ways through other non-agent mechanisms.
152 Fauchart and von Hippel, supra note 3, at 193.
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former employee. Critically, he sent this “letter to a number
of his colleagues, so that the community as a whole would
learn of his former employee’s violation.” 153
The letter—and the reputational implications it carried—
enforced the informal rule demanding attribution for
creators. In the Fauchart and von Hippel model, the
attribution rule ensures that chefs have sufficient incentives
to produce new recipes. In the absence of robust protection
from formal intellectual property law, chefs who produce
new recipes would be unable to capture the pecuniary
rewards associated with those recipes because all other chefs
could copy the recipes. But an informal rule requiring
attribution could permit chefs who produce new recipes to
capture non-pecuniary status rewards (and, possibly,
subsequent pecuniary rewards associated with increased
status) by demanding community recognition for the initial
creator of a recipe. In this way, informal rules allocating
status rewards to the creators of new works can provide the
motivation to produce such works.
While we do not reject their interpretation—indeed, we
agree that their model provides at least some explanatory
power for their observations—we emphasize a distinct role
for these informal rules. In our model, the attribution rule
facilitates the head chef’s role in organizing the creative
collaboration that occurs in her kitchen. Suppose the recipe
is the result of creative inputs from several (not too many)
cooks in the kitchen. But it is hard to avoid shirking by the
cooks in that kitchen team. The attribution rule might vest
the head chef with control over the status rewards
associated with a particular recipe—other chefs interested in
hiring a cook can seek information from the original chef
about the relative contributions of the team members. The
attribution rule in effect identifies the repository of
information, and the chef then uses her control over the
reputational rewards (and punishments) she can apply to
elicit collaboration from the cooks in the first instance.
In these examples, the producer and the chef are in
positions to dole out reputational rewards and penalties.
And, when doing so, they use informal rules to regulate
intra-team behavior. If the production of a recipe is a
collaborative endeavor, with the head chef at the top of the
hierarchy, then this ability to enforce penalties on team
members (even after the collaboration is over) is an
153
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important way in which the chef can manage the creative
inputs—the other cooks in the kitchen.
Thus, in the Fauchart and von Hippel model, informal
rules provide incentives for creative work by ensuring that
the right kitchen is credited with a recipe. Credit then
provides non-pecuniary rewards in the form of increased
status or pecuniary rewards. In our model, the informal
rules allocate control to a head chef who can then ensure
that the right cooks within a given kitchen receive rewards
for their collaboration (or are punished for failing to
collaborate).
C. Conflicts Between Formal Law and Informal Rules
Formal copyright law incorporates a romantic view of the
sole author. This creates stark problems when non-Western
cultures clash with the sole author myth that drives
Western copyright law. In such cases, formal law may be in
tension with the work that informal rules do (and vice
versa), undermining types of creative collaboration that
function well under one regime but poorly under another.
Copyright litigation involving Aboriginal art in Australia
provides a salient example of such clashes between formal
copyright law’s notion of a single author-owner and informal
rules of collaboration and communal control. 154 Litigation
there has pitted informal rules of Aboriginal communal
authorship that evolved over centuries against a
superimposed Western copyright law focused entirely on the
single author. 155
For example, the notable case of Bulun Bulun v. R & T
Textiles 156 dealt with ownership and control over a painting
derived from the communal folklore of an indigenous group,
known as the Ganalbingu. Senior members of the
Ganalbingu had, in accordance with their community
standards, authorized John Bulun Bulun to paint the
artwork using elements of the Ganalbingu’s sacred and
ritual knowledge. Textile producers then copied the artwork
onto fabric patterns. While those producers had admitted to
See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty., 86 F.C.R. 244, 246 (1998) (a
leading Aboriginal art case where the court was faced with the question
of whether the rights to a painting derived from communal folklore
belonged to the community from which the folklore had been developed);
see also Daniela Simone, Dreaming Authorship: Copyright Law and the
Protection of Indigenous Cultural Expressions, (draft).
155 Id. at 246; see also Simone, supra note 154.
156 86 F.C.R. 244.
154
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infringing Bulun Bulun’s rights, the representatives of the
Ganalbingu claimed that the rights belonged to the
Ganalbingu people in common, not Bulun Bulun in
particular, and sued to vindicate those rights.
An ordinary copyright analysis would have attempted to
identify an author-owner of the original aesthetic expression
in the painting. 157 But there were so many contributors over
so many years and with so many variations that it would
have been futile in this case. And the informal rules were
clear that no single author could control the folklore;
instead, these senior members of the Ganalbingu, chosen
and acting in accordance with established community
standards, had the effective ability to permit or prevent use
of the folklore. Western notions of sole author-owners of
creative works cannot easily accommodate this type of
collaboration.
In the end, the Australian court intuitively recognized
that control in this context was different from the Western
notion of control. Enforcing legal rules of ownership could
not get the control question right—the law on its face
prohibited the informal rules from playing any role at all. 158
Recognizing “the inadequacies of statutory remedies under
the Copyright Act as a means of protecting communal
ownership,” 159 the court concluded that while Bulun
Bulun—the individual painter who physically fixed the work
in its tangible medium—had a copyright (and the
concomitant ability to prevent or authorize reproductions of
the painting), he also had a fiduciary duty to exercise his
rights to the benefit of the Aboriginal community. 160
Thus, while the Aboriginal community did not have a
copyright in its folklore, it did retain some formal legal
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (extending copyright protection
only to an expression, not to the underlying ideas); Feist Pubs., Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (requiring that a work be
original—that is, contain at least minimal creativity and not be copied—
in order to qualify for copyright protection).
158 As one scholar has pointed out in this context, “copyright law remains
committed to a one-size-fits-all model of creativity that does not
represent the variety of types of creativity that flourish in the modern
world.” Simone, supra note 154.
159 Bulun Bulun, 86 F.C.R. at 246.
160 Id. In this particular case, because Bulun Bulun had already sued the
infringers, there was nothing left for the court to do. As a practical
matter that meant that the Ganalbingu people had no additional legal
remedies. Id. It did however provide some power for indigenous
communities to protect their rights in the future.
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power: it could sue to enforce its informal rules against
community members who create works based on that
folklore. And, of course, the community retained the ability
to use its informal rules to determine which of its members
could create such works in the first place. Community
members who create such works in violation of the informal
rules prescribing who may create them can be punished by
expulsion from the community or by lowered status within
the community. Notably, however, the community appears
to have no power over outsiders who might create works
based on that folklore.
The outcome of the case leaves many open questions,
reflecting the complexities that arise from overlaying rigid
formal law on informal creative communities. 161 The
Australian court refused to grant ownership of communal
folklore to any party. It also rejected calls to create a
constructive trust that would have allowed the community
to control its communal folklore. At the same time, it
invented a new fiduciary duty that forced members of the
community to protect the value of the communal folklore.
The practical difference between creating a trust and
creating a fiduciary role is murky, but as a formalist legal
matter the fiduciary duty merely defines the relationship
between the community and its members while a trust
would have required the court to take the radical (from the

Similar problems have been identified in other cultures. See David B.
Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property
Law and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can It Fit?, 25
Am. Indian L. Rev. 93, 100 (2001); see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering
Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175 (2000); Daniel J.
Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred
Intangible Traditional Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467
(2003); Rachael Grad, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law:
A Comparison of the United States and Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 203, 225-226 (2003); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under
Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions
Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United
States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769 (1999); Cortelyou C. Kenney, Reframing
Indigenous Cultural Artifacts Disputes: An Intellectual Property-Based
Approach, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 526-27 (2011) (“Other
countries including Panama, Nigeria, Tunisia, and the Philippines have
passed ‘copyright-like’ laws allowing, inter alia, collective ownership of
sacred indigenous objects, fee distribution to communities whose folklore
serves as a source for creative works, and the criminalization of
“intentional distortion” and misuses of folklore.”).
161
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perspective of Western copyright law) step of allowing
communal authorship to create a property right in art. 162
Bulun Bulun is not as far from the core of Western
copyright as it might at first seem. Informal rules in the
filmmaking community play a similar role to that played by
informal rules in Aboriginal communities—the filmmaking
community dictates rules of control for the various inputs
into a film.
To put the point more radically, Western notions of single
authors and corporate legal personhood 163 establish our
formal notion of who owns a film—the output of the creative
collaboration. And it thereby (attempts to) influence the
inputs to that collaboration. 164 But the community’s
informal rules have much more to say about who controls
the various aspects of that film and its inputs. The formal
allocation of property ownership and contract rights is
significantly disconnected from the reality of control, and the
formal allocation will break down in situations where its
assumptions about the creative process are violated, as they
(likely) were in Garcia and Merkin. 165 Moreover, if the
formal laws were completely different and vested
“ownership” of a film in the hands of the filmmaking
community (in Hollywood as a legal person), we doubt the
resultant use of those rights would look much different than
the status quo. 166
A recent article by Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky treads territory adjacent to that explored in
Bulun Bulun. 167 In their provocative and thorough study of
the area, Bell and Parchomovsky propose the use of a
“Copyright Trust” to deal with some of the thorny issues
posed by creative collaborations. The trust mechanism
would allow a court to separate ownership and control of
Simone, supra note 154 (noting the adaptability of fiduciary duties
relative to constructive trusts).
163 Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29.
164 See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6.
165 See supra Part IV.A.
166 Similar community collaboration phenomenon may arise in the
context of new Western media that are beyond the scope of this paper.
See, e.g., Shun-Ling Chen, Collaborative Authorship: From Folklore to
the Wikiborg, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, 131 (Spring 2011); cf.
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm
112 YALE L. J. 369 (2002).
167 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29 (citing and critiquing Casey &
Sawicki, supra note 6).
162
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copyrighted material. 168 The beneficial owners of the
copyright would be determined based on contribution, while
a trustee would be appointed to exercise complete control
over the copyright. 169 One might think of this as forced (or
default) firm ownership. The court can create a firm and
impose a manager at the top of the hierarchy. This proposal
could be viewed as similar to the fiduciary relationship that
the Australian court imposed in Bulun Bulun. 170
Bell and Parchomovsky noted that while their analysis
addressed theoretical problems similar to those addressed in
our analysis of formal law and collaboration, their proposed
solution “may be viewed as antithetical to those espoused by
Casey and Sawicki.” 171 We agree with that characterization,
and our analysis here of informal law widens the gap
further.
To be sure, in a world of pure formal law we see little to
object to in the Copyright Trust proposal. But the
introduction of informal law and the non-hierarchical
governance we have theorized in this Article render a
Copyright Trust proposal either destructive of collaborative
creation or impossible to implement. Informal law can create
a governance or control structure that exists without
contract and without integration. It allows for adaptive
governance rules to evolve in response to the diverse
production inputs and roles that might be necessary for
creative collaboration.
A court imposing a Copyright Trust could destroy that
governance system. Imagine a court attempting to allocate
control over a film to one person and then allocating
ownership shares based on creative input. Bell and
Parchomovsky suggest that nothing in their proposal denies
contractual solutions. But they do not address informal, noncontractual solutions. If the court can allocate control to one
person except in the presence of a contractual provision,
then that would essentially destroy the role of informal rules
altogether. 172 Like the outcome in Bulun Bulun, this
Id.
Id.
170 While the Bulun Bulun court did not create a constructive trust, a
fiduciary duty, of course, has many of the trappings of a trust
relationship.
171 Id.
172 A similar concern in Bulun Bulun was that creating a property right
owned in constructive trust for the Ganalbingu people would hinder
rather than enhance communal creativity by placing the control outside
168
169
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structure places legal constraints on informal mechanisms of
control and favors rigid formal mechanisms over the flexible
informal ones developed by the creative communities
themselves.
In cases like Merkin, their trust concept would produce
strange results where control is wrested from those intended
and understood to possess it by long standing norms and
placed in the hands of a trustee who must then adjudicate
the proper use of the materials to benefit the interests of all
contributors (however broadly the notion of “contributors” is
defined). If that power were actually exercised, it could have
major adverse effects on the creative collaboration. Either
every party would have to negotiate formal control
agreements where informal rules have, in the past, sufficed
or collaborations would cease.
But that is not likely to happen. In reality, for the same
reason that producers do not exercise final cut, we do not
think a Trust structure is likely to have much impact.
Informal rules are too powerful. The court might allocate
control to one trustee, but that control would likely diffuse
back out to the market. And contributors would be wary to
involve a court for fear of exclusion from future projects in
the industry. 173 This is why we say the Trust might be
impossible to implement. Much as a producer cannot freely
exercise final cut authority within the bounds of the
contractual provision, so too a trustee would not be able to
freely distribute proceeds within the bounds of her fiduciary
duty, nor would a participant in a creative collaboration be
able to freely call upon a court to create a Copyright Trust.
At best, the implementation of the Copyright Trust would
forcibly allocate beneficial ownership (that is, compensation
for contribution) where the contracts are vague while
changing little about control. That outcome is not as
problematic. But it does not address the key questions of
control that are at the heart of the creative collaboration
problem—the challenges of coordinating unobservable and
uncertain inputs to creative production remain.
of the communal norms. It is not clear that the Bulun Bulun court
avoided this problem when it created a fiduciary relationship.
173 One might alternatively, take this analysis to suggest that the courts’
decisions in the high profile cases discussed above are unlikely to have
major impact. The norms will in most cases control. The result is that we
need not worry too much about the judicial errors. But we should still
worry that we have little real understanding about what is going on in
the space regulated by copyright law.
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D. Crowding Out and the Cliff of Formal Law
A final observation about the interaction of formal and
informal law is important for copyright design. Formal
intellectual property law is generally more one-size-fits-all
than informal rules, which are created and enforced by the
community to which they apply. 174 Informal rules might,
then, be better suited to facilitating a diversity of
approaches to creative collaboration.
For example, consider a chef who is deciding whether to
collaborate on a recipe. If we protect rights in recipes the
way we protect literature—according rights in the “fixed”
output to someone labeled an “author”—we might see less
collaboration. 175 Assume that the law provided solid
protection once a recipe was written down. In developing a
recipe, a chef might not want to let anyone else know her
thoughts until she is ready to transform it into that written
form
of expression. 176 Pre-expression
collaboration
undermines protection because it provides others with
access to ideas before those ideas are protected by law (just
as co-authoring a novel does). The chef in such a world
might instead decide to produce new recipes as a sole creator
and shun collaborative efforts because collaboration exposes
her to the risk that her collaborators will misappropriate her
ideas.
Somewhat counterintuitively, in a world with weaker
formal protection for recipes, the (relative) cost of pre
expression collaboration may be much lower. Once a dish is
cooked anyone can copy it. The chef is just as vulnerable to
the theft of the final recipe as to idea inputs into the recipe.
To be sure, the chefs may not innovate at all if there is no
protection. But informal rules have developed to provide
that protection. And in contrast to formal protection of a
final recipe that begins only when the recipe is complete,
See Perzanowski, supra note 3, at 585-87 (arguing that norms may be
more responsive than formal copyright law to the incentives required to
produce creative work in the tattoo industry); Oliar & Sprigman, supra
note 3, at 1840-41 (making a similar argument with respect to stand-up
comedy). See also Michael Carroll, One for All: The Problem of
Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 85657 (2006) (describing the uniformity cost of copyright law).
175 See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces:
Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007).
176 Id. at 1131-32 (arguing that a dish would satisfy copyright’s fixation
requirement once it has been cooked and the recipe written down).
174
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norms enforced through reputation have no cliff effect (or at
least a plausibly less dramatic cliff effect because the
content and enforcement of the informal rules is fuzzier than
that of the formal law) and are as likely to protect against
input idea theft as to final recipe theft. In this way, formal
law that imposes protections may alter the foundation of
collaborative organization in complex and perhaps
unpredictable ways.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the influence of
informal rules on the production of creative work is far more
significant than currently supposed. While the conventional
wisdom holds that informal rules dominate primarily in
areas like cuisine, stand-up comedy, tattoos, and magic,
where copyright’s incentive effect is weak or nonexistent, the
reality is that informal rules influence all areas of creative
activity where there is collaboration; that is, all areas of
creative activity. So even when copyright law’s incentive
effect operates forcefully, as it does in film, music, and
literature, informal rules likely have an enormous impact on
the production of creative work through their regulation of
the collaboration required to produce movies and songs and
books. This conclusion significantly increases the scope of
influence for informal rules in the creative industries.
Much, of course, remains to be done. We have only begun
to outline here the many potential interactions between
formal law and informal rules with respect to collaboration.
Our hypotheses should be rigorously tested with significant
industry-specific exploration of creative work. This Article
provides a framework for thinking about informal rules
throughout the creative industries. Future work should
build on that framework so that scholars and policymakers
can obtain a more accurate understanding of copyright law,
creativity, and collaboration.
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